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Abstract  
 
This paper analyzes the popularity of the main political entities in Portugal. After 
describing the recent evolution and structure of the Portuguese political system, we 
present estimations of popularity functions for the Assembly, Government, Prime 
Minister, and President using several estimation techniques to incorporate the time-
series and cross-equation aspects of the models. The results strongly favor the 
responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting 
popularity levels. There is also evidence that voters’ evaluations of incumbents’ 
economic performance depends on the ideology and support in Parliament of the latter. 
Finally, there is evidence of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of 
honeymoon effects. 
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1. Introduction  
Although the international literature on the influence of economic conditions on 
the popularity of politicians and electoral results is extensive and started several years 
ago,1 there is very little work on the Portuguese case.2 This paper tries to fill that gap in 
the literature by analyzing the main determinants of the popularity of the Portuguese 
Assembly, Government, Prime Minister, and President, from May 1986 to October 
1999. We start by testing the responsibility hypothesis and the existence of honeymoon 
effects, popularity depreciation over consecutive terms in office, and personality effects. 
Then, we account for partisan effects in our popularity functions, and investigate if the 
way voters hold the political entities responsible for economic outcomes depends on the 
entities’ ideology. Finally we test the hypothesis that voter’s evaluations of incumbents’ 
economic performance depends on their support in Parliament, implying that 
governments that enjoyed a smaller support in Parliament would be less penalized for 
bad economic outcomes. 
We start by estimating our popularity functions models using OLS. Then, in 
order to appropriately take into account the time series properties of the series, we apply 
the Box-Jenkins analysis to the data, and estimate the ARIMAX model suggested a  
appropriate. Finally, because the popularity of the four political entities is likely to be 
influenced by common factors, we estimate a system of popularity functions for the four 
entities using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with AR components. 
Sections 2 and 3 describe the evolution and structure of the Portuguese political 
system in order to provide some background to the analyses performed. Section 4 
presents the data set used in the paper. The empirical results are reported in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. The Portuguese political system since April 25, 1974 3  
 In a bloodless coup on April 25, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement 
(Movimento das Forças Armadas – MFA), a group of mainly left-wing military officers, 
seized power and put an end to the so-called New State (Estado Novo), an authoritarian 
regime that had lasted 48 years. In the following two years there was considerable 
turmoil in the Portuguese political system. Initially, the country was run by the Junta of 
National Salvation (which was replaced by the Council of the Revolution on March 
1975), but there then followed six temporary governments and two presidents. Over this 
period, independence was given to the African Overseas Territories, and two military 
uprisings took place (in March and November, 1975). Elections for the Constituent 
Assembly, that would prepare and approve a new constitution, were held in April 1975. 
 The new constitution came into effect on April 25, 1976, and elections for the 
Assembly of the Republic, the Portuguese unicameral parliament, were held on the 
same day. Two months later, on June 27, General Ramalho Eanes, an independent 
military candidate, was elected President of the Republic. He then invested a minority 
government led by Mário Soares, th  leader of the socialist party, on July 16. Eleven 
years of great political instability followed, during which about ten minority and 
coalition governments failed before completing their terms, and five legislative 
elections took place. After two terms of Ramalho Eanes as President of the Republic, 
Mário Soares won the second runoff of a disputed presidential election (on February 16, 
1986), and became the first civilian head of state in 60 years. 
On July 19, 1987, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) became the first political 
party in the thirteen years since the fall of dictatorship to win an absolute majority of 
 4
seats in parliament. Cavaco Silva, who had led a minority government in the two 
previous years, was able to form an all-PSD government, and to be the first prime 
minister since 1974 to complete his term. He was then reelected by an overall majority 
of the electorate on October 1991, ruling the country for another four years. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here  
 
Economic recession and scandals involving members of government led to a 
growing erosion of the government’s popularity, which prompted Cavaco Silva to 
abandon the leadership of PSD on January 1995, and prepare his bid for the presidency. 
The Socialist Party (PS) won the October 1995 elections, coming very close to an 
overall majority in Parliament (112 of a total of 230 deputies), and António Guterres 
became prime minister. Three months later, Jorge Sampaio, former mayor of Lisbon 
and candidate of the socialist party, won the presidential elections against Cavaco Silva. 
For the first time since 1974, a minority government managed to stay in power 
for the entire term. The most recent legislative elections took place on October 10, 
1999, and were again won by the socialists, who got exactly half of the seats in 
parliament. Although they do not have an overall majority, they cannot be removed by a 
no-confidence vote, suggesting they are likely to stay in power until the 2003 elections. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here  
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3. Structure of the Portuguese politica l system  
 Since the constitutional revision of 1982 that eliminated the Council of the 
Revolution, the organs of sovereignty in Portugal are the President of the Republic, the 
Assembly of the Republic, the Government, and the Courts. 
 The President of the Republic is directly elected for a five-year term via a secret 
ballot with universal adult suffrage. There is a second round runoff between the two top 
vote-getters if none of the contenders receives a majority of the votes in the first round. 
Presidential candidates must be Portuguese citizens, aged 35 or over. They can either 
run as independents, or be the appointed candidate of a political party. No President can 
serve for more than two consecutive terms. 
The main duties of the President are: to serve as th  head of State and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; to set the dates of legislative elections after 
consulting the parties; to appoint the Prime Minister and the members of the 
Government suggested by the latter; to dissolve the parliament and call for anticipated 
elections; and, to promulgate and have published laws, decree-l  and gulations. The 
President also has the power to veto laws and decrees, or to send them for consideration 
by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The Assembly of the Republic is the Portuguese unicameral parliament, 
currently composed of 230 deputies elected for a period of four years by direct and 
secret universal adult suffrage, using a proportional electoral system. The duties of the 
Assembly include (among others): enacting legislation in all areas except those reserved 
to the Government; approving amendments to the Constitution; approving the 
government’s general budget and plan of activities; passing motions of confidence or 
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censure to the government; and appointing ten of the thirteen members of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
 The Government formulates the general policy of the country and is the highest 
organ of public administration. It therefore has political, legislative, and executive 
powers. Its legislative power consists of proposing laws to the Assembly and issuing 
decrees. Its executive power extends to the execution of the general plans of activities 
and budgets of the State. The Government is responsible to both the President, who can 
dismiss it, and to the Assembly of the Republic, which must approve its plans and 
budgets and may dismiss it by passing a censure motion (a no-conf dence vote). 
The Government consists of the Prime Minister (generally the leader of the party 
that received the most votes in the last elections), the Ministers, the Secretaries of State, 
and the Under-Secretaries of State. The President usually consults the political parties 
(and takes into account recent election results) when appointing or dismissing a Prime 
Minister. The other members of the Government are appointed by the President at the 
proposal of the Prime Minister. 
 Finally, the Courts are organs of sovereignty with competence to administer 
justice in the name of the people. They are independent of the other organs and subject 
only to law. Their decisions are binding on all public and private institutions and prevail 
over the decisions of all other authorities. 
 Since the Government is responsible for the conduct of economic policy, we 
expect it to be the organ of sovereignty whose popularity depends most upon the 
performance of the Portuguese economy. The popularity of the Prime Minister - the 
most visible member of the Government – is likely to be next in sensitivity to economic 
performance. Because the Assembly is usually domin ted by the party in government 
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and approves the laws, plans, and budgets proposed by the latter, it may also be held 
responsible for the performance of the economy. Finally, the President can only veto the 
laws or decrees proposed by the Government, or dismiss it. Thus, we expect the 
popularity of the President to be the least affected by economic performance. 
Taking into account the evolution of the political system described in the 
previous section and increasing influence of the European Union on domestic p licies, 
especially on monetary issues, we expect the way voters hold national political entities 
responsible for economic conditions to vary over time.
 
4. The data  
The period analyzed in this paper begins in May 1986 and ends in October 1999. 
This period includes three terms of social democratic governments and a term of a 
socialist government. Popularity data is available from a weekly national journal called 
Expresso. Euroexpansão c nducts the polls on a monthly basis, by telephone interviews 
to a representative sample of about 600 Portuguese adults. The respondants are asked to 
classify the performance of the Prime Minister, the Government, the Assembly of the 
Republic, and the President of the Republic as very good (VG), fairly good (FG) or bad 
(B). We calculate a popularity index, POPt, for each of the four entities, where the index 
is a weighted sum of the percentages responding very good and fairly good. 
Specifically, the index is defined as POPt=(2*VGt+FGt)/2.4 The values of the index 
over the period studied are shown in Figure 1. 
Monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted and standardized, were 
collected from OECD-Main Economic Indicators. Inflation rates, nominal exchange 
rates, real effective exchange rates, interest rates, and the industrial production index 
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were collected from the International Financial Statistics data of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis  
In this section we describe the results of our empirical analysis. Our popularity 
functions model support for incumbent politicians as a function of economic and 
political variables. Economic variables are included to test the responsibility hypothesis, 
which suggests that voters hold politicians responsible for economic conditions. Several 
economic series have been used in previous studies of popularity functions, but 
unemployment and inflation are the most commonly used and have received the greatest 
empirical support. The underlying idea is that the evolution of these series affects the 
utility of voters, who therefore, punish (or reward) politicians for increases (or 
decreases) in unemployment and inflation.5 The influence of political factors is typically 
taken into account by including variables to control for the erosion of popularity over 
time in office, or to reflect honeymoon effects of the newly elected politician with the 
electorate immediately after an election. It is also common to include dummy variables 
to control for personality factors or special events. 
The popularity functions we estimate are of the following form: 
 POPt = a + b(L)POPt + fPt + hHt  + diTit + jXt + ut  (1) 
The dependent variable, POP, is the popularity index for each of the four political 
entities. The underlying idea is that popularity levels depend on pr vious levels of 
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popularity, (L)POP, dummy variables indicating the Prime Minister or President in 
office, P, honeymoon effects, H, dummy variables for consecutive terms in office, Ti,
and a set of variables representing overall economic performance, X. 
Portugal had two Prime Ministers and two Presidents during the time period 
under analysis. It is possible that the popularity levels they enjoyed depended partly on 
their personal characteristics. In order to account for personal effects on the popularity
of the political entities considered in the paper, two dummy variables were included in 
the set of explanatory variables. The first, GUTERRES, takes the value of one when 
António Guterres is the Prime Minister, and zero otherwise. It was included in the 
estimations for the Prime Minister, Government, and Assembly. The second, 
SAMPAIO, takes the value of one when Jorge Sampaio is the President of the Republic, 
and zero otherwise. It was included in the estimations of the President’s popularity. 
Honeymoon eff cts are captured by a discrete variable,H, that takes the value of 
six in the first month of each term, declining to one in the sixth month, and taking the 
value of zero thereafter. The hypothesis being investigated is that politicians have 
higher popularity indexes during the first months of their administration. Since longer 
time in office is usually associated with erosion of popularity, we expect negative 
coefficients for the dummy variables T2 andT3, representing the second and the third 
terms in office, when the dummy for the first term is not included in the estimation. 
In our basic specification, overall economic performance is captured by the rates 
of inflation and unemployment. We also tested for the effects of the percentage changes 
of the industrial production index, the nominal exchange rate (Portuguese escudos per 
US dollar), the real effective exchange rate, and real interest rates. The economic 
variables were always lagged because economic data is released with a time lag, in 
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some cases of a few months, making it impossible for the interviewed people to know 
their current values. 
 We first estimated all of our models using OLS. To take into account the time 
series properties of the series we also applied the Box-Jenkins analysis to the data, and 
then estimated the ARIMAX model suggested as appropriate. Because the popularity of 
the four entities analyzed is likely to be influenced by common factors, we estimated a 
system of popularity functions for the four entities by SUR. 
 Finally, we testd for partisan effects, for the importance of the incumbent’s 
support in Parliament, and for the influence of the entrance to the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System (on April, 1992) or to the European 
Monetary Union (on January 1999) on the way voters hold the political entities 
accountable for economic outcomes. That was done by adding to the set of independent 
variables interaction variables between the economic variables and the dummy variables 
accounting for the above-mentioned effcts. 
 
5.1. OLS results  
 Results of OLS estimations are shown in Table 3.6 he first lag of the popularity 
index is always highly statistically significant and a second lag is also significant in all 
estimations, although to a lesser degree.7 The coefficients associated with the dummy 
variables GUTERRES and SAMPAIO have negative signs in the four estimations. They 
are statistically significant in the estimations for the Prime Minister and Government, 
showing that the popularity of these two entities tended to be smaller when António 
Guterres was Prime Minister (a socialist government was in office). The same cannot be 
said about the Assembly, whose popularity does not seem to depend on the particular 
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Prime Minister or the ideology of the government in office. With respect to the 
President’s popularity, results suggest that it was not affected by the replacement of 
Mário Soares by Jorge Sampaio on January 1996. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here  
 
 The coefficients associated with the dummy variables that represent the second 
and the third terms in office (T2 and T3, respectively) have a negative sign in all 
estimations, as expected. The estimated coefficients are highly statistically significant in 
all but one instance: T2 is not significant in the estimation for the Assembly. But, T3 is 
highly significant in the same estimation, meaning that there is still evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis that consecutive terms in office lead to the erosion of popularity.8 The
results support the existence of honeymoon effects for all entities except the President. 
That is, the Assembly, the Government and the Prime Minister seem to enjoy a higher 
level of popularity in the beginning of their terms. 
 The results indicate that higher rates of unemployment decrease the popularity 
of the political entities considered. The estimated coefficients have a negative sign, as 
expected, and are statistically significant in all but one estimation: that of the Assembly. 
Regarding the President, the results are a bit surprising given his small influence on 
economic policy. We would expect his popularity to be the least affected by economic 
conditions. Finally, there is no evidence that higher average inflation9 leads to l wer 
popularity. This variable is never statistically significant. 
Recursive Least Squares10 was used to evaluate the stability of the model over 
time11 in several ways. We started by simply checking whether the recursive residuals 
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tended to lie within the ±2 standard errors bands. Then, one-step-ahead and n-step-
ahead forecast tests12 were performed. All these tests fail to reject the hypothesis that 
the parameters of the four equations of Table 3 are stable. 
 
5.2. ARIMAX results  
The high persistence of popularity indexes is usually taken into account by 
including lags of the dependent variable in the estimations, as we did in Table 3. But, 
the time series structure of a series may be more appropriately addressed by applying 
the Box-Jenkins methodology for model selection. 
Our first step was to find out if the popularity indexes of our four political 
entities followed an ARIMA process. Since Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests 
show evidence of stationarity for the popularity indexes, these can only follow ARMA 
processes. Autocorrelations and partial correlations of those series suggest 
autoregressive processes of order two, AR(2), for all indexes.
Then, we also estimated an ARIMA model that incorporates the explanatory 
variables used in our OLS estimations of Table 3. The results of this ARIMAX model, 
which in our case has only autoregressive (AR) components, are shown in Table 4. 
They are somewhat similar to those of OLS estimations. The major differences are the 
lack of evidence of personality effects (the dummy GUTERRES is no longer significant) 
and the fact that the average inflation rate becomes marginally statistically significant 
for the Assembly and Government. Conclusions regarding other variables remain the 
same. 
 
Insert Table 4 around here  
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5.3. SUR results  
Because the popularity of the four political entities analyzed may be influenced
by common factors, and the residuals of the estimations may be correlated, we 
estimated the four equations as a system, using the seemingly unrelated regressions 
technique, commonly known as SUR. 
Results, presented in Table 5, reveal a few minor differences from those of the 
ARIMAX models shown in Table 4. First, there is more evidence of personality effects. 
The dummy variable GUTERRES is now statistically significant for the Government 
and Prime Minister. The negative signs of the coefficient estimat s suggest that António 
Guterres and his Government are less popular than were their antecessors. Second, all 
the estimated coefficients for average inflation are again insignificant, as in OLS 
estimations. Finally, the estimated coefficient for the unemployment rate is statistically 
significant for the Assembly. Since Wald tests reject the hypotheses of equal 
coefficients for the unemployment rate across the four political entities, we can say that 
Portuguese voters do not tend to hold these political entities equally responsible for the 
evolution of the unemployment rate. The highly statistically significant effect of 
unemployment on the President’s popularity is a bit surprising, given his very small 
power over economic policy. 
 
Insert Table 5 aroun d here  
 
The residual correlation matrix at the bottom of Table 5 indicates that there is 
considerable correlation between the error terms of the estimations for the Prime 
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Minister, Government and Assembly of the Republic. The correlations of these 
equations’ residuals with that of the President are smaller but not negligible. Thus, we 
can safely argue that it was appropriate to estimate the equation as a system, by SUR. 
 
5.4. Partisan effects and support in parliament  
 The analysis performed above assumes that the electorate holds the political 
entities responsible for higher inflation or unemployment in a way that is independent of 
the entities’ political orientation. Although the dummy variable GUTERRES also 
represents the left,13 a negative coefficient would nly mean that the left-wing-oriented 
political entities tended to be less popular in general.
Swank (1993) introduced partisan considerations into popularity functions. 
Following Hibbs (1977), he assumed that left-wing parties care more about 
unemployment and economic growth than right-win  parties, which are more concerned 
with inflation. Therefore, during recessions the demand for expansionary policies 
increases, making left-wing proposals more attractive, and the reverse occurs during 
expansions. Assuming that politicians and voters behave optimally, left-wing parties 
lose support when inflation rises, unemployment falls or economic growth rises, while 
right-wing parties gain support from these economic changes. 
We tested this hypothesis by adding two i teraction variables to the model. We 
included the product of average inflation, and of the unemployment rate, with a dummy 
variable, LEFT, that takes the value of one when the political entity in office is left-wing 
oriented, and zero otherwise. A positive es imated coefficient was expected for 
UnempRate(-1)*LEFT, as the left is supposed to gain support when unemployment 
rises, and a negative coefficient was expected for AvInflati n(-2)*LEFT, as the left loses 
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support when inflation rises. Since the President was always left-wing-oriented in our 
sample, it was not possible to test for partisan effects on the President’s popularity. 
Thus, we estimated a SUR model just for the other three political entities. 
 Results, presented in Table 6, show evidence of partisan effects related to 
unemployment, but not to inflation. Although all estimated coefficients for the 
interaction variables have the expected signs, those for AvInflation(-2)*LEFT are not 
statistically significant. UnempRate(-1)*LEFT is always statistically significant, which 
provides evidence that left-wing-oriented political entities are less penalized by 
increases in unemployment than right-wing ones. 
Another interesting result is that the estimated coefficients for average inflation 
are statistically significant for the Government and Prime Minister, as in the ARIMAX 
models, providing some additional evidence that voters also tend to punish these 
political entities for higher inflation. 
 
Insert Table 6 around here  
 
 According to Anderson (2000) and Powell and Witten (1993), evaluations of the 
political entities’ performance should take into account their power and responsibility 
over economic policy. That is, political entities with greater authority to set economic 
policy should be those most accountable for economic outcomes. Then, governments that 
are not supported by a majority of seats in parliament should be less accountable than 
those that are, since lapses in performance can be blamed on actions taken by the 
opposition. 
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 We tested the hypothesis that the Assembly, the Government, and the Prime 
Minister are less accountable for economic outcomes when the party in power does not 
have a majority of seats in the parliament. That was done by adding two interaction 
variables that are the products of inflation and unemployment with a dummy variable 
that indicates when there is a minority government.14 Si ce the President is always 
elected by a majority of voters and his policies do not depend on his support in 
parliament, he was not considered in these estimations. 
 The results are shown in Table 7. As in our tests of partisan effects, all estimated 
coefficients for the interaction variables have the expected signs, but only those 
concerning unemployment are statistically significant. That is, entities not upport d by 
a majority of deputies in Parliament tend to be less penalized for higher unemployment, 
but that effect is not statistically significant for inflation.15 Thus, we only find limited 
support for Anderson (2000) and Powell and Witten’s (1993) hypothesis that the 
evaluations of the political entities’ performance takes into account their power and 
responsibility over economic policy. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here  
 
5.5. Other results  
We also considered the robustness of our results to a number of specification 
choices. First, we used alternative weights in defining the popularity index.16 Second, 
we allowed popularity to deteriorate smoothly with time in office (and not just over 
consecutive terms) by including an independent variable measuring time in office (in 
months). Third, we allowed for different definitions of the honeymoon effects dummy, 
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H.17 Fourth, we used alternative definitions of average inflation.18 Fi ally, we estimated 
specifications that added as independent variables the monthly percentage change of the 
industrial production index, the nominal exchange rate, the real interest rate, and the real 
effective exchange rate (both jointly, and one at a time). None of these changes had 
important effect on the previous results.19 
Finally, we testd the hypothesis that the additional constraints on economic 
policy that resulted from the entrance of the Portuguese Escudo to the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System, on April 1992, changed the way 
in which voters held the political entities accountable for economic outcomes. This was 
done by including a dummy variable, ERM, that takes the value of one after April 1992, 
and two interaction variables that are the product of that dummy with the 
unemployment rate, ERM*UnempRate(-1), and with average inflation, 
ERM*AvInflation(-2). The same procedure was used to test a similar hypothesis about 
the entrance to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in January 1999. In both 
cases, there is no evidence that the voters’ evaluation of the political entities changed 
after those events.20 
 
6. Conclusions  
 Our estimates of popularity functions for Portugal are consistent with the 
responsibility hypothesis: voters hold the four political entities under investigation 
responsible for economic outcomes, especially unemployment. They also provide some 
evidence that Portuguese voters hold incumbents responsible for inflation. Results 
suggest the existence of honeymoon effects and of popularity depreciation over 
consecutive terms in office. In most of the estimations, we additionally find that the 
 18
popularity of the Government and of the Prime Minister tended to be smaller when 
António Guterres was Prime Minister (a socialist government was in office), while 
personality effects do not generally affect the popularity of the Assembly and President. 
We also find some support for Swank’s (1993) partisan hypothesis. Results 
regarding unemployment are consistent with his hypothesis, but those concerning 
inflation are not. Similar conclusions are reached when testing for Anderson’s (2000) 
and Powell and Witten’s (1993) hypothesis that the effect of economic outcomes on 
popularity should be affected by whether or not the party in power has a majority of 
seats in the Assembly of the Republic. That is, we find evidence that minority 
governments are less penalized for higher unemployment, but that effect is not 
statistically significant for inflation. Finally, there is no evidence that the effect of 
economic outcomes on the popularity of the political entities analyzed n this paper 
changed after the adherence to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System or to the European Monetary Union. 
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1 Seminal papers are Goodhart and Bansali (1970), Kramer (1971) and Mueller (1971). See Lewis-Beck 
(1988) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for surveys on the topic. 
2 One exception is Veiga (1998). 
3 For a more complete description of the evolution and structure of the Portuguese political system, see 
several issues of Arthur Banks’ Political Handbook of the World and of the World Europa Yearbook. 
4 The weighted sum of VGt and FGt is divided by two in order to force the index to lie between 0 and 100. 
5 Whether voters are forward-looking or backward-looking in their vote decisions will not be an issu  for 
the moment. For simplicity, we assume expectations to be based on competence revealed by politicians in 
the past. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) state on page 238: “voting is retrospective; but the relevant 
expectations are very static. Forward looking expectations consequently work equally well.” 
6 Tests of stationarity were performed on the variables. This is very important, as classical OLS inference 
is invalid in the presence of nonstationary variables. Results of ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, ind cate 
that the popularity indexes, the monthly inflation rate, and the unemployment rate are stationary. 
Concerning other economic variables used in alternative estimations, the monthly percentage changes of 
the industrial production index, of the end-of-period nominal exchange rate, and of the real effective 
exchange rate are also stationary. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
7 The number of lags of the dependent variable was chosen according to the Schwartz Bayesian 
Information Criterion and absence of autocorrelation. 
8 In the case of the Assembly, “consecutive terms in office” means that the same party dominated the 
parliament over consecutive terms. 
9 The variable used in the estimations of Table 3 to account for the effects o inflation on p pularity levels 
is the second lag of the four-m nth moving average of monthly inflation:  
AvInflationt=(Inft+Inft-1+Inft-2+Inft-3)/4. 
Other definitions of average inflation were tried, but results remained essentially the same. 
10 This procedure estimates an equation repeatedly, using increasing subsets of the sample data. The first 
estimation of the coefficient vector uses the number of observations that is strictly necessary to run the 
model. Then, the next estimation uses one more observation, and this process is repeated until the entire 
 21
                                                                                                                 
sample is used. At each step, a one-step-ahead forecast of the dependent variable is performed using the 
last estimate of the parameter vector. The errors resulting from the series of predictions are the recursive 
residuals, which are independently and normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance if the 
model is valid. 
11 Structural breaks at election dates are accounted for in our model by the dummy variables for the terms 
in office (T2 and T3) and for the personal effects (GUTERRES/SAMPAIO). 
12 The n-step-ahead forecast test uses the recursive calculations to perform Chow Forecast tests for all 
feasible time periods, adding one observation at a time. 
13 In our sample, the socialist party is in power when António Guterres is Prime Minister (GUTERRES=1) 
and the social democrats rule when he is not (GUTERRES=0). 
14 That happened during the first terms of Cavaco Silva (October 1985 to October 1987) and António 
Guterres (October 1995 to October 1999) as Prime Minister, which correspond to the cases in which the 
dummy variable T1 is equal to one (thus, MINORITY=T1). The new variables are then: 
MINORITY*AvInflation(-2) and MINORITY*UnempRate(-1). 
15 But, as in the previous tests, the estimated coefficientsfor average inflation are statistically significant 
for the Government and Prime Minister, providing further evidence that voters also penalize these 
political entities for higher inflation. 
16 POPt=VGt+FGt and POPt=VGt. Where VGt and FGt are the percentage of the interviewed people 
classifying the performance of a political entity as Very Good or Fairly Good, respectively, at time t. 
17 In particular, we variously tried dummy variables that took the value of one in the first 6, 5, 4 or 3 
months of an administration, and zero afterwards. 
18 Namely, we tried a moving average of the last five or six values of monthly inflation. We also tried a 
simple first or second lag of monthly inflation. 
19 There results are available from the authors upon request. 
20 These results are available upon request. 
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Table 1.  Legislative elections and parties in government  
Dates of elections Winning party 
or coalition 
Share in 
Parliament 
Prime Minister Form of government 
     April 25, 1976 
December 2, 1979 
October 5, 1980 
April 25, 1983 
October 5, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
PS 
AD=PSD+CDS+PPM 
AD=PSD+CDS+PPM 
PS 
PSD 
PSD 
PSD 
PS 
PS 
43% 
51% 
54% 
40% 
34% 
59% 
58% 
48% 
50% 
Mário Soares 
Sá Carneiro 
Sá Carneiro 
Mário Soares 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
One party, minority 
Coalition 
Coalition 
Coalition (PS+PSD) 
One party, minority 
One party 
One party 
One party, minority 
One party 
Note: PS – Socialist Party (center left); PSD – Social Democratic Party (center right); CDS – Social 
Democratic Center (right), PPM – Monarchic Popular Party (right, monarchic). 
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Table 2.  Presidential elections  
Dates of elections President (Major opponent) 
  June 27, 1976 
December 10, 1980 
January 26 and February 16, 1986 
January 13, 1991 
January 14, 1996 
General Ramalho Eanes (Otelo S. de Carvalho) 
General Ramalho Eanes (Soares Carneiro) 
Mário Soares (Freitas do Amaral) 
Mário Soares (Basílio Horta) 
Jorge Sampaio (Cavaco Silva) 
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Table 3:  OLS Estimates  
      Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister President 
     
     C 25.43 
(7.38)*** 
21.07 
(4.90)*** 
25.91 
(4.65)*** 
40.94491 
(3.97)*** 
     POP (-1) 0.443 
(6.48)*** 
0.551 
(6.12)*** 
0.659 
(9.32)*** 
0.387 
(5.01)*** 
     POP (-2) 0.110 
(1.99)** 
0.172 
(2.44)** 
0.085 
(1.67)* 
0.179 
(2.77)*** 
     GUTERRES -0.536 
(-0.58) 
-2.933 
(-2.52)** 
-3.768 
(-2.48)** 
 
     SAMPAIO    -1.224 
(-1.26) 
     T2 -0.271 
(-0.31) 
-2.647 
(-3.06)*** 
-3.860 
(-3.61)*** 
-2.962 
(-2.63)*** 
     T3 -2.293 
(-2.61)*** 
-4.542 
(-3.77)*** 
-6.189 
(-3.85)*** 
 
     H 1.097 
(4.43)*** 
0.860 
(3.64)*** 
1.042 
(3.86)*** 
0.196 
(0.70) 
     AvInflation (-2) -0.558 
(-0.69) 
-1.601 
(-1.55) 
-1.879 
(-1.36) 
0.085 
(0.07) 
     UnempRate (-1) -0.321 
(-1.49) 
-0.600 
(-2.44)** 
-0.947 
(-3.14)** 
-0.966 
(-2.93)*** 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.81 0.86 0.65 
Schwarz criterion 4.69 5.16 5.32 5.29 
F-statistic 38.06 79.51 117.98 40.49 
     
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the column 
heading; 
 - monthly observations from May 1986 to October 1999; 
- t-statistics, using Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors, are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 4:  ARIMAX Models Results  
      Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister President 
     
C 57.01 
(14.93)*** 
70.46 
(13.51)*** 
91.95 
(14.58)*** 
93.98 
(30.11)*** 
     GUTERRES -1.303 
(-0.68) 
-4.601 
(-1.20) 
-5.054 
(-0.95) 
 
     SAMPAIO    -2.590 
(-1.65) 
     T2 0.562 
(0.38) 
-5.613 
(-2.40)** 
-8.879 
(-2.98)*** 
-5.592 
(-3.37)*** 
     T3 -4.371 
(-2.15)** 
-9.769 
(-2.53)** 
-13.90 
(-2.66)*** 
 
     H 1.285 
(5.94)*** 
1.438 
(4.59)*** 
1.858 
(4.60)*** 
0.465 
(1.07) 
     AvInflation (-2) -2.122 
(-1.89)* 
-2.267 
(-1.90)* 
-2.316 
(-1.52) 
0.477 
(0.35) 
     UnempRate (-1) -0.703 
(-1.37) 
-2.404 
(-3.43)*** 
-3.934 
(-4.71)*** 
-2.267 
(-5.41)*** 
     AR (1) 0.523 
(6.15)*** 
0.591 
(7.49)*** 
0.730 
(10.71)*** 
0.370 
(4.89)*** 
     AR (2) 0.153 
(2.00)** 
0.219 
(2.76)*** 
0.109 
(1.89)** 
0.162 
(2.81)*** 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.81 0.86 0.64 
Schwarz criterion 4.72 5.16 5.31 5.30 
F-statistic 36.55 80.15 118.88 39.80 
     
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the column 
heading; 
 - monthly observations from May 1986 to October 1999; 
- t-statistics, using Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors, are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 5: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with AR components  
     
 Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister President 
     
C 57.07 
(16.25)*** 
71.03 
(14.28)*** 
92.69 
(16.05)*** 
94.01 
(27.80)*** 
     GUTERRES -0.482 
(-0.25) 
-6.524 
(-2.34)** 
-7.991 
(-2.37)** 
 
     SAMPAIO    -2.458 
(-1.43) 
     T2 0.181 
(0.10) 
-8.154 
(-3.36)*** 
-11.98 
(-4.26)*** 
-5.764 
(-4.22)*** 
     T3 -3.749 
(-1.94)* 
-12.34 
(-4.31)*** 
-17.42 
(-5.01)*** 
 
     H 1.161 
(4.15)*** 
1.587 
(4.29)*** 
2.138 
(5.16)*** 
0.234 
(0.70) 
     AvInflation (-2) -1.420 
(-1.23) 
-2.047 
(-1.42) 
-2.277 
(-1.46) 
0.711 
(0.47) 
     UnempRate (-1) -0.823 
(-2.00)** 
-1.983 
(-3.19)*** 
-3.397 
(-4.61)*** 
-2.279 
(-5.10)*** 
     AR (1) 0.465 
(7.49)*** 
0.547 
(9.40)*** 
0.576 
(9.64)*** 
0.364 
(4.67)*** 
     AR (2) 0.138 
(2.39)** 
0.141 
(2.51)** 
0.151 
(2.58)** 
0.179 
(2.32)** 
     
    Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.64 
S.E. of regression 2.28 2.90 3.14 3.08 
     
     
Residual Correlation Matrix    
     Assembly 1.00 0.66 0.54 .022 
Government 0.66 1.00 0.71 0.24 
Prime Minister 0.54 0.71 1.00 0.27 
President 0.22 0.24 0.27 1.00 
     
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the column 
heading; 
 - monthly observations from May 1986 to October 1999; 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 6: Tests of partisan effects using SUR with AR components  
    
 Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister 
    
C 61.20 
(16.15)*** 
76.69 
(13.99)*** 
98.48 
(15.49)*** 
    GUTERRES 
(LEFT) 
-10.87 
(-2.15)** 
-22.27 
(-2.91)*** 
-24.01 
(-2.69)*** 
    T2 -0.694 
(-0.41) 
-9.987 
(-3.87)*** 
-13.18 
(-4.74)*** 
    T3 -4.907 
(-2.77)*** 
-14.26 
(-5.30)*** 
-19.56 
(-6.02)*** 
    H 1.386 
(5.02)*** 
1.948 
(5.22)*** 
2.536 
(6.11)*** 
    AvInflation (-2) -1.889 
(-1.51) 
-2.841 
(-1.76)* 
-3.070 
(-1.76)* 
    UnempRate (-1) -1.343 
(-2.98)*** 
-2.639 
(-3.83)*** 
-4.055 
(-4.89)*** 
    AvInflation (-2)*LEFT -0.259 
(-0.07) 
-0.286 
(-0.06) 
-0.383 
(-0.08) 
    UnempRate (-1)*LEFT 1.607 
(2.19)** 
2.408 
(2.11)** 
2.438 
(1.78)* 
    AR (1) 0.432 
(6.77)*** 
0.535 
(9.08)*** 
0.559 
(9.17)*** 
    AR (2) 0.116 
(1.97)** 
0.115 
(2.00)** 
0.136 
(2.31)** 
    
   Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.79 0.85 
S.E. of regression 2.27 2.92 3.17 
    
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the column 
heading; 
 - monthly observations from May 1986 to October 1999; 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 7: Tests of minority effects using SUR with AR components  
    
 Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister 
    
C 49.38 
(11.19)*** 
61.03 
(9.39)*** 
83.58 
(11.02)*** 
    GUTERRES 0.386 
(0.20) 
-5.588 
(-2.08)** 
-7.456 
(-2.30)** 
    T2 12.68 
(2.46)** 
8.734 
(1.16) 
4.335 
(0.49) 
    T3 9.518 
(1.72)* 
5.377 
(0.64) 
-0.434 
(-0.04) 
    H 0.974 
(3.14)** 
1.340 
(3.20)*** 
1.937 
(4.12)*** 
    AvInflation (-2) -1.838 
(-1.40) 
-3.168 
(-1.85)* 
-3.753 
(-2.00)** 
    UnempRate (-1) -1.748 
(-3.38)*** 
-3.216 
(-3.94)*** 
-4.640 
(-4.67)*** 
    AvInflation(-2)*MINORITY 0.468 
(0.20) 
2.617 
(0.89) 
3.583 
(1.12) 
    UnempRate (-1)*MINORITY 2.060 
(2.68)*** 
2.682 
(2.25)** 
2.581 
(1.79)* 
    AR (1) 0.442 
(7.15)*** 
0.531 
(9.06)*** 
0.561 
(9.20)*** 
    AR (2) 0.118 
(2.06)** 
0.132 
(2.35)** 
0.148 
(2.51)** 
    
   Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.80 0.85 
S.E. of regression 2.25 2.90 3.14 
    
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the column 
heading; 
 - monthly observations from May 1986 to October 1999; 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%.
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Figure 1.  Popularity index  
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